Non-Technical Abstract
In the past 15 years, the conduct of environmental policy has changed signi…cantly in all major Western democracies. This is re ‡ected by increasingly ambitious environmental targets, but also in the instruments used to achieve these targets. Traditionally, environmental policy has been based on so-called command-and-control instruments, such as design standards, which require the use of a particular technology, or performance standards or quotas, which prescribe the maximum amount of emission allowable from each source. Although these tools are still widely used, a remarkable shift towards the use of incentivebased instruments, such as environmental taxes and tradeable pollution permits, has taken place in recent years. Many European countries, notably the Scandinavian countries, have increasingly shifted attention towards environmental taxes, while the trend in the U.S. has gone in the direction of tradeable permits. This paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice that can help us understand these tendencies. The theory is based on the notion that the choice of environmental policy instrument derives from the activities of politicians, who value political o¢ce, voters, who attempt to control the behavior of politicians by making reelection contingent on past behavior, and a special-interest group (an industry lobby group), which seeks political in ‡uence by providing monetary rewards to politicians (bribes or campaign contributions). What we have in mind is a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial production to a pre-speci…ed target. The target can be implemented by one of three instruments: The transition from command-and-control to incentive-based policy instruments can be understood as a natural consequence of more ambitious environ-4 mental targets and/or (abatement) cost-reducing technological progress. The intuition is appealing. As environmental targets become more strict, the industry lobby group, representing the interests of the polluting industry, becomes more and more interested in cost-e¢ciency, and starts supporting tradeable permits or even pollution taxes. This eventually moves the economy away from quantity controls and sets of a three-stage transition: [Q] to [P] to [T] or, if transaction costs are high, a two-stage transition: [Q] to [T] . In the face of cost-reducing technological progress, the industry lobby group becomes generally speaking less concerned with the choice of instrument, and its willingness to pay for either quantity controls or tradeable permits diminishes. As a result, politicians start paying more attention to voters, and the economy moves towards pollution taxes.
The di¤erent paths observed in the European democracies, [Q] to [T] , and the U.S., [Q] to [P] , can best be understood as a result of the interaction between cross-country di¤erences in political institutions and the general trend towards stricter environmental targets and lower abatement costs. Broadly speaking, the European transition to [T] and the U.S. transition to [P] can be understood as a re ‡ection of di¤erences in the role played by lobby groups, with U.S.
politicians being more responsive to special-interests than their European counterparts. In addition, the cost of operating a permit market is likely to fall over time once it gets going due to learning-by-doing. This increases the industry lobby's willingness to pay in support of [P] , and suggests that [P] The paper is related to a small but growing literature on the political economy of instrument choice in environmental policy, such as Buchanan and Tullock (1975) , Dijkstra (1999) , and Boyer and La¤ont (1999) . Our model can be seen as a generalization of the theory of environmental regulation developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1975) in the sense that we expand the set of instruments by [P] , and model, formally, the political con ‡ict between polluters and taxpayers. The main innovation of the model, however, is the analysis of the dynamic transition between political equilibria -something that can help us understand why the status of incentive-based instruments has risen in the political arena in many democracies.
The paper has 9 sections. In section 1, we introduce the paper and summarize the main results. In section 2, we brie ‡y review recent trends in environmental policy, and provide an overview of the latest developments in Europe and the U.S. In section 3, we survey previous theoretical contributions to the literature on the political economy of instrument choice. In section 4, we discuss the economic structure of our model. In section 5, the nature and impact of the three policy instruments are set out. In section 6, we describe political decision making. We characterize political equilibrium in section 7, and analyze the dynamic transition from one equilibrium to another. In section 8, we interpret the results, and in section 9, we conclude. Tables   Table 1: Environmental taxes in EU15 as a percentage of total tax revenue. 
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Introduction
In the past 15 years, the conduct of environmental policy has changed signi…cantly in all major Western democracies. This is re ‡ected by increasingly ambitious environmental targets, but also in the instruments used to achieve these targets. Traditionally, environmental policy has been based on so-called command-and-control instruments, such as design standards, which require the use of a particular technology, or performance standards or quotas, which prescribe the maximum amount of emission allowable from each source. Although these tools are still widely used (see, e.g., Hahn, 1989) , a remarkable shift towards the use of incentive-based instruments such as environmental taxes and tradeable pollution permits has taken place in recent years. Many European countries, notably the Scandinavian countries, have increasingly shifted attention towards environmental taxes (OECD, 1997), while the trend in the U.S. has gone in the direction of tradeable pollution permits (Svendsen, 1998; Ellerman et al., 2000) . Recently the interest in tradeable pollution permits has increased also in Europe where the Commission of the European Union, having failed to gain support for a common CO 2 tax, is contemplating setting up a market for This paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice that is designed to illuminate these tendencies and to highlight at least some underlying forces. To accomplish this, we need more than a static theory of instrument choice. We need a dynamic theory that can explain the change in equilibrium policy over time. With the exception of Boyer and La¤ont (1999) this dynamic aspect of environmental instrument choice has not been considered much in the literature. The main contribution of the paper is to provide a theoretical framework that can be used to characterize the transition from political equilibria with command-and-control regulation to equilibria with incentive-based policy instruments as the outcome of an evolving political compromise between special-interests and the electorate. The precise nature of the compromise depends on many factors, but we identify three which we believe to be of particular importance: increasingly ambitious environmental targets, (abatement) cost-reducing technological progress, and learning-by-doing driven reductions in the transaction cost of trading pollution permits.
Our model has a number of features that should be highlighted at the outset. First, we concentrate on the choice of instrument, taking the environmental target to be achieved as predetermined. This simpli…cation is motivated by the fact that countries often enter international agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol) that commit them to certain targets, but leave it up to the individual country to decide how to achieve these targets. Likewise, it is not uncommon that a domestic target is, explicitly or implicitly, chosen before deciding on the speci…c means to achieve it. Examples of this include the U.S. Acid Rain Program (see Stavins, 1998 : p 77) as well as the national greenhouse gas reduction targets introduced by the UK and other European countries in the mid 1990s (see Marshall, 1998) .
Second, to achieve the environmental target, we assume that the government has access to three policy instruments; these are [Q]: quantity controls; [P]: tradeable permits; and [T]: pollution taxes. We take the set of instruments as given, and choose the two incentive-based instruments to mirror the type of policy instruments actually used in Europe and the U.S. The tradeable permit instrument, for example, allocates the permits for free (as in the U.S. pollution trading programs), and we recognize that permit trading is associated with transaction costs (Stavins, 1995) . The pollution tax is levied on emission and recycles, at least partly, the tax revenue to the general public (as, for example, in Norway and Sweden).
Third, it is well-known that the two incentive-based instruments are more e¢cient that quantity controls (Baumol and Oates, 1988 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brie ‡y review 13 recent trends in environmental policy. In section 3, we survey previous theoretical contributions to the literature on the political economy of instrument choice.
In section 4, we discuss the economic structure of our model. In section 5, the nature and impact of the three policy instruments are set out. In section 6, we describe political decision making. In section 7, we characterize political equilibrium, and analyze the dynamic transition from one equilibrium to another.
In section 8, we interpret the results, and in section 9, we conclude. same period (European Environmental Agency, 2000). Table 1 shows the contribution to total tax revenue from three types of environmental taxes:
energy taxes, transport taxes, and pollution taxes. Energy and transport taxes, typically, have an environmental rationale, and are in many cases di¤erentiated according to pollution content (e.g., SO 2 or CO 2 content).
Pollution taxes are levied directly on emissions. We notice that energy taxes account for the lion's share of the revenue generated.
The speci…c design of environmental tax programs with respect to tax base, revenue use, and exceptions di¤ers from program to program. Following Cansier and Krumm (1997), we can, however, categorize pollution tax programs into two broad categories, referred to as the "Pure-TaxApproach" (PTA) and the "Tax-cum-Earmarking" (TCE) approach. PTA refers to a situation in which the incentive e¤ect of the tax is the key motivating factor behind the program, and the tax revenue contributes to the public budget without being tied to speci…c purposes. This leaves open the possibility of recycling the revenue as reductions in distortionary taxes and thus has the potential of generating a "double dividend" (see Goulder, 1995) . TCE refers to a situation in which the tax revenue is being earmarked for speci…c purposes. The motivation for earmarking di¤ers quite a lot, and so does the (positive or negative) incentive e¤ects thereof.
A widely used principle is to reimburse energy-intensive sectors or …rms and to grant certain industries and sectors tax exemptions (see Ekins and Speck, 1999) . Tables 1:1 ² Pollution permit markets. Since the mid-70s, a number of tradeable permit systems has been used in the U.S. to control air and water pollution. Key features of eight of these programs are summarized in Table   1 :3, adapted from Svendsen (1998 , Table 4 They conclude that it has been successful: environmental targets have been more than met; trading volumes have been increasing over time; and the estimated cost saving amounts to about $1 billion a year, compared to the cost of command-and-control regulation (Stavins, 1998 , p. 71).
While air pollution permit trading has largely been associated with the U.S., similar programs are now being adopted in some European countries, such as the UK and Denmark, to help control CO 2 emissions (Ekins and Speck, 2000). Also at the international level, the interest in pollution permit trading is on the rise. For example, one of the so-called ‡exibil-ity mechanisms set out by the Kyoto Protocol envisions an international market for tradeable CO 2 emissions allowances (see Grubb, 2000) . Finally, the European Union is contemplating setting up a market for tradeable greenhouse gas emission permits by 2005 (CEU, 2000).
Positive Theories of Instrument Choice
There is a small but growing literature on the political economy of instrument choice in environmental policy. The classical paper in the area is Buchanan and Tullock (1975) . They show that a competitive industry that generates pollution prefers a pollution quota system to a pollution tax, and argue that this preference is likely to prevail politically. 4 The logic is appealing. The quota system enforces a reduction in total industry output, and raises pro…ts.
Taxes, on the other hand, reduce industry pro…ts, and the …nancial losses do not disappear until a su¢cient number of …rms has relocated to other sectors. While "(t)hose who anticipate bene…ts from the utilization of the tax revenues, whether from the provision of publicly supplied goods or from the reduction in other tax levies, should prefer the tax alternative and they should make this preference known in the political process" [p. 142], Buchanan and Tullock go on to argue that the supporters of the tax alternative will be politically weak relative to the small, well-organized group of …rms and therefore lose out. The political con ‡ict between organized industry interests and of society, represented by a majority of the electorate, is also key to our argument, but we take the analysis one step further. We model explicitly the process by which a compromise between the two parties is reached, and identify the circumstances under which voters prevail, Dijkstra (1999, chapters 8 and 9) analyses the choice between command-andcontrol instruments and incentive-based instruments in a rent-seeking contest.
In a rent-seeking contest, supporters and opponents of di¤erent policy instruments can invest e¤ort to increase the probability of getting their most-favored policy implemented. He …nds that incentive-based instruments are chosen with low probability in equilibrium when they are supported by a relatively large group of supporters with a low per capita stake. This formalizes the hypothesis of Olson (1965) that smaller groups are more likely to have political voice and leads to the conclusion that tax instruments ([T]) are rarely chosen in political equilibrium. Dijkstra (2000) shows that this tendency is preserved in contests where both the choice of instrument and the distribution of the revenue from tax instruments are subject to rent-seeking. Our approach di¤ers from this in several ways. First, we take the set of pol-
[T]g, as given, and do not consider the possibility of constitutional constraints. Instead, we evaluate when and whether each instrument is part of a political equilibrium. Second and more importantly, we o¤er a dynamic model that is well-suited to study the evolution of political equilibrium over time and thus to explain why the choice of policy instrument changes.
Third, citizens vote, and this is explicitly accounted for in our analysis.
The Economy
Economic activity and policy choices take place over in…nite discrete time, t = 0; 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ . Citizen-consumers are identical and live for ever. Their instantaneous utility is de…ned over the consumption of a numeraire good y t , a produced good x t , a public good g t , and environmental quality, 1 ¡ e t , where e t 2 [0; 1] is emission of pollutants. The total utility of a representative citizen-
where u(:) and u e (:) are increasing and strictly concave functions, and¯is the discount rate. The representative citizen-consumer is endowed with ¹ y units of the numeraire good each period, and the price of good x is denoted p t . The public good is, where applicable, …nanced by the revenue generated by a pollution tax. For the time being we maintain the assumption that the tax revenue is recycled fully to citizen-consumers. 6 This is clearly an extreme assumption, and we shall relax it in due course.
A continuum of …rms, of measure 1, produce good x. Each …rm produces one unit at zero marginal cost. Total production is therefore x t = 1, implying
Production of x pollutes the environment, and in the absence of regulation, each …rm emits one unit of pollution each period, such that aggregate emission is e t = 1. Firms can lower emissions at a cost. Let a it = 1 ¡ e it be the abatement level of …rm i in period t. The abatement cost function is
We assume, in addition, that
Di¤erences in abatement costs among …rms are captured by µ i . A …rm with a low µ i has high abatement costs and vice versa. Technological progress (A t+16
We do not explore the possibility that the tax revenue can be used to reduce distortionary taxes on labor and capital. As shown by Goulder et al. (1996) this may underestimate the e¢ciency gains of [T] by as much as 25%. 7 The use of a quadratic cost function is not restrictive. What is important is that the abatement cost function is convex. Convexity implies that the e¢ciency gain associated with and the harmonic mean´=
We assume that both are …nite and positive. By Jensen's inequality,´< ¹ whenever the distribution F is non-degenerate.
Environmental Regulation
We consider a society that has committed to reduce emissions according to a predetermined target, denoted ¹ e t 2 (0; 1], and ¹ e t+1 · ¹ e t . The target ¹ e t can be 
Quantity Controls: [Q]
The government cannot tailor quantity controls appropriately to the conditions of each …rm, and we assume that it therefore uses a uniform emission quota system. The quota issued to each …rm is valid for one period, and allows the holder to emit up to ¹ e t units. To avoid exceeding the quota, abatement e¤ort of a it = 1 ¡ ¹ e t per …rm is required, and the resulting per period pro…ts are
Total industry pro…ts are
The instrument [Q] does not achieve abatement at least cost, as the marginal cost of abatement is higher for low-µ …rms than for high-µ …rms.
Tradeable Permits [P]
As an alternative to quantity controls, the government can issue tradeable permits. We assume that each …rm is given permission to pollute ¹ e t units free of charge. Firms are allowed to trade permits among themselves. The permits are valid for one period only and cannot be saved. Organizing and maintaining an e¤ective permit market is costly for numerous reasons: search and information collection is costly; bargaining and decision costs can be high as can monitoring and enforcement costs (Stavins, 1995) . We capture this aspect of permit trading by assuming a …xed cost of trading, which is shared by all participating …rms. 9 8 To insure that industry pro…t is positive, we assume that U 0 (1)¸1 2A 0 µ L . This condition is su¢cient to ensure non-negative pro…ts for all ¹ e t > 0 and under all three instruments in the absence of transaction costs. We do not allow entry. Our results hold qualitatively in a setting in which there is free entry and the marginal …rm makes no pro…t, but the analysis becomes much more complex as high-cost and low-cost …rms might disagree on which policy instrument to support. 9 This is slightly di¤erent from a situation where …rms choose whether or not to pay the cost and trade, but the di¤erence is not essential for our results. Modelling the transaction cost as a …xed cost also implies that there is no marginal distortions and a permit market, if viable, will therefore produce the least cost allocation. Stavins (1995) has shown that this is not the case if transaction costs are related to the volume of trade in a nonlinear way. We maintain the current assumption for simplicity, but note that permit trading becomes less attractive for the industry as a whole if the deviation from the least cost allocation is substantial.
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The cost of trading may be falling over time for many reasons. We focus on two and assume that the cost of trading is given by Á t = Á ®tAt where Á¸0. First, technological progress related to advances in telecommunication and better accounting systems and procedures to track emission are likely to reduce the cost of running a permit market. For simplicity, we shall assume that technological progress reduces transaction and abatement costs at the same rate. 10 Second and more importantly, once a market has been established, the participating …rms learn from the experience, and the reduction in trading costs is likely to accelerate due to learning-by-doing (® t¸®t¡1 > 0).
Suppose permits are traded at the price q t in period t. Firm i chooses its emission level to maximize its current pro…t
Pro…ts are maximized at 11 (1 ¡ e it ) = q t µ it :
Market clearing implies
Substituting in the expression for pro…ts yields
10 This assumption can be relaxed without a¤ecting the qualitative nature of our results but only at the cost of greater complexity. Moreover, in the absence of any precise empirical evidence on the relative speed of cost reductions, it seems as good an assumption as any. 11 To rule out corner solutions in which the most e¢cient …rms decide to stop emitting, we assume that
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Comparing equations (2) and (4) In the initial phase of a program of gradual abatement, …rms, therefore, favor control-and-command regulation.
Pollution Taxes [T]
As an alternative to the permit system or to quantity controls, the government can levy a tax on emissions, at the rate ¿ t . 12 Firm i chooses e it to maximize its pro…t
knowing that it has to pay ¿ t e it in taxes if it emits e it units of pollution. The …rst order condition yields
12 We consider a simpler tax policy than Boyer and La¤ont (1999) , where …rms face a tax schedule T (e it ). Our simpli…cation is harmless because ¹ e t is exogenous.
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To reduce total emission to ¹ e t , the tax rate must satisfy
Substitution yields the expression for …rm pro…ts
Industry pro…ts are
We note that [P] and [T] achieve exactly the same least cost allocation of abatement, and …rms that emit more than average pay the same price for additional units of emission under the two systems. The di¤erence between the two systems is their …nancial implications. Under the tax system …rms have to pay for all the units they emit, and the revenue is transferred to voters. Under the permit system, …rms do not pay for unabated emission within their allowance, and …rms that decide to abate more than required can sell their permits, implying a transfer from high-cost …rms to low-cost …rms. By direct evaluation of equation (6) 
Lemma 2 establishes that [P] is preferred to [T]
unless ¹ e t is either close to 0 or to 1. 13 >From a …nancial point of view, the di¤erence between the two systems is the total tax bill, ¹ e t (1 ¡ ¹ e t )=¹A t , which under the permit system 13 If the condition Á¹ < is always preferred to [P ]. 
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accrues to the industry and under the tax system accrues to the government (to citizen-consumers).
14 If the environmental standard is extremely lax, or extremely stringent, the tax bill is too small to compensate for the …xed transaction cost (Á t ). In the former case, the tax rate is negligible, and in the latter, the tax base is negligible. Table 2 summarizes the industry pro…ts associated with each policy instrument.
Pro…ts and Instruments
Proposition 1 establishes that each instrument achieves the highest pro…t for some emission target.
There exists a " H and a " L such that 0 < " L < " H < 1 for all t and as discussed by Grafton and Devlin (1996) , the government combines [P] with a charge that extracts (part of) the rent from the industry, then [P] becomes much like [T] . Figure 1 : The emission target and industry pro…ts under the three instruments
Proof. We note, from Lemma 1, that ¹ V t (P)¸¹ V t (Q) whenever ¹ e t · " 1t , and from Lemma 2 that ¹ V t (T) > ¹ V t (P) whenever ¹ e t < " 2t . Comparing equations (2), (4) and (6), we obtain
The condition Á <
The e¤ect of the instrument choice on industry pro…ts can be understood quite intuitively, and is illustrated in Figure 1 . The Figure shows industry pro…ts under the three instruments as a function of the environmental target for given A t and ® t . In the absence of transaction costs, ¹ V t (P) always exceeds ¹ V t (Q) and
; as " L = 0 and " H = 1 whenever Á = 0 for all t. Small transaction costs change this. First, suppose that the environmental target is lax, i.e., ¹ e t ' 1.
Due to the gains associated with achieving allocative e¢ciency, permit trading,
[P], always has an advantage over quantity controls, [Q] , but the advantage is small relative to the …xed cost of trading when little abatement is required. This
. Second, suppose the environmental target is strict, i.e.,
. This is somewhat counter- 
The Political Market
We imagine that the instrument choice is an evolving compromise among the interests of politicians, of voters, who has the power to dismiss elected politicians, and of special-interest groups, who are willing to pay to see their preferred policy implemented, and therefore can, if necessary, compensate politicians for the loss of o¢ce. Following earlier work (Aidt and Dutta, 2001 ), the political process is modeled as a dynamic democracy with the following key elements:
1. Repeated elections and performance voting. Voters delegate decision making power to politicians in elections. We assume that citizensconsumers hold a majority of the electorate. Politicians cannot commit to policy actions before an election, and once in o¢ce, they can implement the policy that they want and potentially respond to the lobbying activities of organized special-interests (see below). Voters observe policy implementations and hold politicians responsible for their choices in the next election. In particular, as in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), we assume that voters try to control politicians by setting performance standards. At the beginning of each period, voters announce an election rule,´t(S t ), which speci…es whether or not the incumbent politician is being reelected as a function of the policy, S t 2 fQ; P; Tg, implemented 30 during the current term of o¢ce. Formally, the election rule is a mapping from fQ; P; Tg ! f0; 1g where´t(S t ) = 1 indicates that the incumbent is reelected, and´t(S t ) = 0 that he is not and a challenger enters o¢ce.
From the analysis in section 5, we know that voters prefer [T] to either [Q] or [P] because of the revenue e¤ect. 15 It follows immediately that they employ the following stationary election rule:
2. Lobbying activities. It is clear from section 5 that …rms have a strong interest in the instrument choice. We assume that all …rms in the industry join forces and organize a lobby group, despite the free rider problem (Olson, 1965) . The industry lobby group represents the interests of all …rms sincerely in the political process, and is able to redistribute internally among the members. 16 We assume that the lobby group o¤ers payments to the politician in return for speci…c policies, as in Berheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997). We think of these payments as bene…ts that occur to the politician personally, and a natural interpretation is that they represent bribes but other interpretations are possible. The important point to stress, however, is that the lobby group has access to a more powerful control instrument than voters. The lobby group can o¤er explicit incentives, while voters can only o¤er implicit incentives via the threat of terminating the tenure of an "under-performing" politician.
Formally, a lobbying strategy is a payment function, b t (S t ), that maps the 15 Except when ¹ et = 0 or et = 1 where they are indi¤erent among the three instruments. 16 We have chosen the formulation with one industry lobby group for simplicity. The model can be extended to the case where di¤erent segments of the industry (say the clean and the dirty …rms) form separate lobby groups, but the additional complications do not add essential new insights.
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policy choice made by the incumbent politician in a given period into a monetary payment. The lobby group discounts the future at rate¯, and
3. Power and money. Politicians care about holding o¢ce for many reasons. We focus on two, namely money and power. Politicians may like power for its own sake. To capture this, we assume that a politician receives the ego-rent, m, each period he holds o¢ce. We assume that m is the same for all politicians. In addition, holding power allows the politician to collect payments from the lobby group. The per-period payo¤ of an elected politician is
We assume that a politician that is voted out of o¢ce is never reelected, and will get his reservation utility, normalized to zero. Politicians discount the future at rate¯.
The timing of events is as follows. Each period an election takes place. Immediately after each election, voters announce an election rule. This is observed by all. Next, the lobby group announces a payment function to the politician.
Taking as given the election rule and the payment function, the incumbent politician implements a policy, S t 2 fQ; P; Tg. The lobby group then makes the promised payment, and a new election is held. This sequence of events repeats itself every period, and is summarized in Figure 2: 7 Political Equilibrium we characterize the set of stationary political equilibria. To this end, assume that ¹ e t = ¹ e; A t = A and ® t = ® for all t. This makes the economy completely stationary and if something is an equilibrium in period t so it is in period t + i, i = 1; :::; 1. Proposition 2 summarizes the possible equilibrium con…gurations.
Proposition 2 (Stationary Political Equilibrium) De…ne M =¯m 1¡¯. The following stationary policy sequences are implemented in Markov perfect equilibrium:
Proof. The value function of the incumbent politician is
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The lobby group designs its payment function b(S t ) to maximize
knowing that the politician implements the policy that maximizes equation (9), and that voters follow the election rule,´(S t ) = 1 , S t = T . Since the periods are not physically linked, the lobby group designs b(S t ) to maximize current net bene…t. Clearly, the lobby group will never pay for Table 2 Proposition 2 shows that each of the three policy instruments is politically feasible under appropriate conditions. Voters prefer [T] and reelect the incumbent politician only if this instrument is employed (and they get the revenue).
To get either [Q] or [P] implemented, the lobby group has to compensate the incumbent politician for the resulting loss of o¢ce, and pay a bribe equal to M -the value of holding o¢ce in the future: It is therefore clear that the instrument choice depends i) on the policy preference of the lobby group, and ii) on its willingness to pay relative to M . In contrast to Buchanan and Tullock (1975) , we note that the preference of the lobby group does not prevail under all circumstances: even when e > " L and the lobby group's most-preferred policy
, the equilibrium policy is [T] whenever abatement costs are low (A is high) and/or the value of o¢ce is high. 17 More generally, the Proposition shows that equilibrium policy depends crucially on underlying economic fundamentals, notably abatement technology, the emission target, and the transaction cost of permit trading. These variables evolve over time causing shifts in the instrument choice. We show, in Proposition 3, how the instrument choice at time t responds to such changes.
Proposition 3 (Transitional Politics) Let ¹ e t · ¹ e t¡1 , A t¸At¡1 and ® t® t¡1 . At political equilibrium, the stationary policy function, S t = S(¹ e t ; A t ; ® t );
characterizes the instrument choice as follows:
3. S t = T otherwise:
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2. Pro…ts ¹ V t (S t ) are stationary functions of ¹ e t ; ® t and A t . This follows from Proposition 1. As before, [P] is an equilibrium at time t if and only if
and
Similarly, [Q] is an equilibrium at time t if and only if
Proposition 3 obtains by substitution of the relevant expressions for ¹ V t (S t ) in equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) ² Cost-reducing technology progress (A t ). Cost-reducing technological progress reduces the pro…t di¤erentials,
This in turn reduces the industry lobby group's willingness to pay for
. To see the consequences, suppose that ¹ e t = ¹ e and that cost-
>From Figure 3 , we see that this leads to a transition from ² Transaction costs and learning-by-doing (® t ). One of the reasons why permit trading is costly is the initial lack of experience among traders.
Once a market has been established (perhaps as a consequence of increasingly stringent targets), learning will gradually take place, reducing the cost of trading. 19 To see the implications of this, suppose that learning takes place at a constant rate,°> 0, when a permit market is operating: 18 The speed of at which new abatement technology is adopted and new innovations are made can be systematically related to the type of environmental regulation that …rms are exposed to (see, Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996) . A complete theory would include these feedback e¤ects. 19 Anecdotal evidence from the U.S. supports this hypothesis. The prevalence of internal trading within …rms in the initial phases of the U.S. trading schemes (such as the Emission Trading Program) which was replaced by signi…cant external trading in the subsequent Acid Rain Program is one piece of evidence. Another is the emergence of various intermediaries and brokers (see Stavins, 1995) . To the extent that the learning process has international spill-over e¤ects, the logic of our model suggests that permit trading may become a viable alternative in Europe, predicting a transition from [T] to [P] . If, for example, Europe is located at point 1 in Figure 4 , then, as the learning process in the U.S. reduces the cost of trading at home and abroad, Europe will eventually move towards a permit system.
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The con ‡icting interests of voters, politicians, and lobby groups are mitigated by political institutions, and a policy compromise is reached as discussed above.
The to reelect with a certain probability. An implication of this is that the instrument choice, ceteris paribus, will re ‡ect more closely the preferences of special-interests in societies in which environmental policy and additional revenue is not of major concern to voters. To the extent that European voters are more "green" than their American counterparts and to the extent that the cost of public funds is relatively low in the U.S., this can help explain why pollution taxes have been relatively successful in Europe.
In our model, we assume that all the revenue from [T] is recycled to the electorate. This is an extreme assumption, but one that can easily be relaxed: Our model is simplistic and can be extended in many directions. We conclude by discussing two of the most obvious extensions:
² Endogenous emission targets. We treat the emission target as an exogenous variable. While this is justi…ed in many situations, as discussed in the introduction, ultimately environmental targets are decided upon by societies, and a complete theory of environmental policy would treat the two dimensions simultaneously. When the targets are decided in international negotiations, the political economy of these would have to be modeled to capture the feedback from instrument choice to environmental targets. Doing so is an ambitious undertaking which would be of considerable interest in future research. A more straightforward extension that can be dealt with within the framework of the current model is to allow the society to decide on the instrument and the target jointly. This would help us understand the simultaneous move towards stricter environmental targets and the use of more e¢cient policy instruments.
² Policy packages. Our model focuses on transitions between political equilibria in which a particular instrument is being used. In reality, envi-42 ronmental policy is simultaneously conducted by means of many di¤erent policy instruments. A complete theory would have to take this fact into account.
